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Abstract: Africa‟s post-Cold War relationship with China has created a polemical 
binary. Its critics dismiss it as nothing but an accretion in Africa‟s asymmetric, 
neocolonialist relationship with developed countries. They give the economic aspect of 
it a disproportionately large amount of attention, with the result that their argument 
mostly terminates at the point where it tries to implicate China‟s appetite for raw 
materials and overseas markets in the so-called „Second Scramble for Africa‟. On the 
other hand, its proponents describe it as symbiotic and as critical to the efforts to 
leverage the continent‟s bargaining power in the international economic system. This 
paper seeks to cure the defects in the critics‟ argument by drawing attention to China‟s 
peace efforts on the continent since the end of the Cold War. It suggests the expansion 
of those efforts. Secondary sources and the historical method are used.  
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Introduction 
Africa‟s post-Cold War relationship 
with China (the People‟s Republic of 
China) is one of the most widely 
debated issues today. It began 
formally in 1956 when Egypt 
became the first African and Arab 
country to establish diplomatic 
relationship with China. The 
Bandung Conference of African and 
Asian countries which took place the 
year before provided the platform for 
“the first Chinese diplomatic 
contacts with Africans” (Larskin, 
1971, p.17). It also “marks the 
beginning of Communist Chinese 
activities in Africa” (Slawecki, 
1963). With the establishment of 
diplomatic relationship with China in 
1956 Egypt became the beachhead of 
Chinese diplomatic and political 
penetration of the continent. By 1960 
six other Arab countries, viz. Syria, 
Yemen, Iraq, Morocco, Algeria, and 
Sudan had also established 
diplomatic relationship with China 
(“Dates of establishment”, n.d.). The 
Cold War encumbered the 
penetration from the Arab part of the 
continent. Nevertheless, by 1970 
diplomatic relationship with nineteen 
more countries had been established 
(“Dates of establishment”, n.d.). On 
25 October 1971, the continent 
contributed twenty-six of the 
seventy-six votes by virtue of which 
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Taiwan (the Republic of China) was 
sacked from the UN (United 
Nations) and China‟s UN General 
Assembly and Security Council seats 
were restored to China (Yuan, 2006). 
Mao Zedong thanked Africans, 
saying: “It is our African brothers 
who have carried us into the United 
Nations (Li, 2012).  The relationship 
has passed through three discernible 
periods.  
 
The first period (from the late 1950s 
to the late 1970s) was dominated by 
the Cold War struggles for spheres of 
influence on the continent. During 
the Cold War China gave financial 
and technical assistance to pro-
Beijing countries and arms to some 
independence movements. It 
expected those movements to 
reciprocate with diplomatic 
recognition if they became the ruling 
parties in the post-independence 
politics. (Zimbabwe which has been 
ruled by the Zimbabwe African 
National Union-Patriotic Front 
(ZANU-PF) since independence 
established diplomatic relationship 
with China on 18 April 1980, the 
very same day that it became 
independent). Penetration during that 
period encountered two major 
obstacles both of which had 
something to do with communism.  
 
The first obstacle came from Taiwan. 
Taiwan‟s relationship with those 
European countries that had colonies 
on the continent hampered the initial 
efforts that China made to be 
accepted on the continent as the 
legitimate representative of the 
Chinese people. The phobia which 
the West created about communism 
during the Cold War, coupled with 
colonial indoctrination and tutelage, 
predisposed most of the continent‟s 
first-generation leaders to pursue 
pro-West foreign policies 
(Eze:2002). China rejected attempts 
by some of those leaders to split 
diplomatic recognition between it 
and Taiwan.  
 
The second obstacle came from the 
Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had 
the upper hand in their struggle with 
China for the leadership of 
international communism, as 
evidenced by the delay by most of 
the pro-East countries on the 
continent and elsewhere in 
establishing diplomatic relations 
with the China. For example, Ghana 
established diplomatic relationship 
with the Soviets after six months of 
becoming independent, but did not 
establish with China until after three 
years. The Soviets held far greater 
diplomatic appeal than China 
because of the strategic guarantee it 
could offer in the treacherous terrain 
of the Cold War decades. By the end 
of the 1970s, however, China had 
succeeded in establishing diplomatic 
relationship with about forty-four 
countries on the continent (Foreign 
Ministry of the People‟s Republic of 
China, 2004).  
 
During the second period, i.e. the 
first decade of the post-Mao era, the 
relationship hibernated and 
developing countries became less 
strategically important in China‟s 
foreign policy calculations. That was 
the second time the relationship 
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would hibernate, anyway. It had 
previously hibernated during the 
Cultural Revolution (Shinn & 
Eisenman, 2012). The fall in China‟s 
interest in cultivating developing 
countries was largely due to the 
economic reforms Deng Xiaoping 
launched after Mao‟s death. A 
corollary of those reforms was the 
reshuffle of foreign policy goals. As 
the foreign policy shifted focus away 
from “ideological dogmatism toward 
eclectic pragmatism, from extreme 
totalitarianism toward liberalized 
authoritarianism, from a command 
economy toward "market socialism," 
and from autarkic isolationism 
toward international 
interdependence” (Barnett, 1986), 
Chinese leaders began to tone down 
their denunciation of capitalism and 
to embrace the West without whose 
investment capital the reforms might 
have foundered. Developing 
countries suffered the hemorrhage of 
strategic importance in the 
calculation of the new foreign policy 
during that decade largely because 
they lacked the capital which the 
reforms needed to get off the ground.  
 
The third and present period began 
immediately after the Cold War 
ended. The effects of the reforms, 
which had begun to kick in by the 
time the War ended, have forced 
China to “return” to the continent. 
The loss, in 1993, of the domestic 
capacity to produce all the oil it 
needs particularly forced the 
“return.” The effects have also 
opened the floodgates to more 
diplomatic recognition on the 
continent. With only three countries 
(Burkina Faso, Swaziland, and Sao 
Tome and Principe) still maintaining 
diplomatic relationship with it, 
Taiwan, which has been suffering 
diplomatic defections since losing 
her UN seats in 1971, is no longer 
reckoned a diplomatic rival on the 
continent.  
 
Since the end of the Cold War, China 
has been using both economic and 
non-economic tools to pursue its 
foreign policy goals. It has not only 
embraced the international economic 
system which it once denounced as a 
capitalist monster but also has 
become an active international 
troubleshooter. Africa, which is 
grappling with one of the world‟s 
highest conflict rates, has benefitted 
the most from this increase in 
Chinese participation in international 
troubleshooting.  
 
China‟s widening footprint on the 
continent has created a binary of 
pessimism and optimism. Pessimists 
accuse the Chinese of involvement in 
the so-called „Second Scramble for 
Africa‟ and of friendship with some 
of those leaders (such as Robert 
Mugabe and Omar El-Bashir) who 
the West has labeled as notoriously 
corrupt and dictatorial. One such 
pessimist, Okpeh (2009, p.2), 
contended: 
 
The Sino-African relationship 
has come with its associated 
threats to the survival of 
democracy and transparency, as 
China does not seek to impose 
conditions on its economic 
relations like the West and the 
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United States. This has 
provided a lifeline to autocratic 
regimes in Sudan and 
Zimbabwe who were hitherto 
isolated by the international 
community. Sudan represents 
the clearest example of how 
China comes to Africa with 
money, technical expertise, and 
the influence in such bodies as 
the United Nations Security 
Council to protect the host 
country from international 
sanctions…in Zimbabwe, China 
has been supporting Mugabe‟s 
regime, which is  reviled in the 
international community for its 
ruthless crushing of the 
opposition and the forceful 
[forcible] removal of hundreds 
of thousands of city residents to 
rural areas, with no respect for 
life, health, or satisfactory 
alternative arrangements).   
 
On the other hand, optimists argue 
that the continent stands to benefit 
from deepening the relationship. For 
example, former President Olusegun 
Obasanjo, said: “China‟s presence in 
Africa is very much welcome. We 
respect and cherish old friends from 
the West, but we are eager to make 
new friends from the East and we 
appreciate what China has done and 
is doing in Africa in the areas of 
infrastructure development and 
enhancement of natural commodity 
prices”(Obasanjo, 2013). They 
believe that China can help to reduce 
the continent‟s dependence on the 
West for foreign aid (Elochukwu, 
2012).  
 
This paper draws attention to a very 
important, but less-discussed, aspect 
of the relationship, viz. China‟s 
peace efforts on the continent. 
China‟s interest in the continent is 
not only about the exploitation of its 
abundant economic opportunities. 
It‟s also about resolving its conflicts. 
Still, the economic aspect of the 
relationship continues to receive 
disproportionately large amount of 
attention.  
 
Issues in Sino-African Relations 
The three components of China‟s 
participation in international 
troubleshooting on the continent are: 
diplomacy, peacekeeping and post-
conflict recovery support.  
 
Diplomacy  
In this paper, the Zimbabwean and 
Darfur crises are used as a case study 
of the effectiveness of Chinese 
conflict diplomacy on the continent.  
 
One of the remote causes of the 
Zimbabwean political crisis was the 
peripherization of the black majority 
in the colonial economy. Anyway, 
Zimbabwe‟s colonial economic 
history is not significantly different 
from that of any other African 
country that also experienced 
colonial rule. A leitmotif of colonial 
rule on the continent is that every 
one of the colonial powers ensured 
that the ethnic and racial groups that 
spearheaded the independence 
struggle in its colonies were 
prevented from capturing both the 
political and economic powers at 
independence. For example, in 
Nigeria, where southerners, by virtue 
of the head start they had in the 
acquisition of western education, 
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would have effortlessly captured 
both powers at independence, Britain 
rigged the last colonial elections so 
that the Northern People‟s Congress 
which was the most amenable of the 
nationalist parties could form the 
first indigenous government at 
independence in 1960 (Achebe, 
2012). A similar scheme of power 
bifurcation took place in Zimbabwe 
where Ian Smith‟s white minority 
government grudgingly transferred 
political power to the blacks but 
schemed to ensure that the few 
whites that remained behind as 
settlers inherited the economic power 
through an egregious land ownership 
system.  
 
China‟s involvement in the crisis 
became a subject for international 
debate when a 2008 China-Russia 
veto scuttled a Western-sponsored 
resolution that would have imposed 
UN sanctions against Mugabe and 
the hierarchy of his government. The 
Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) did not support 
any attempt to use sanctions in the 
crisis, as evidenced by its opposition 
to the Western sanctions 
(International Crisis Group [ICG], 
2012) and the no vote which South 
Africa, its most powerful member 
and the recipient of the highest 
number of the crisis‟ refugees, cast 
on the UN sanctions resolution 
(United Nations Security Council 
[UNSC], 2008). China vetoed the 
resolution to prevent it truncating the 
efforts which the African Union 
(AU) and SADC were making to get 
the crisis resolved through 
negotiations (UNSC, 2008).  
 
China used a double-barreled 
approach to mediate the crisis. While 
it opposed the use of sanctions 
against Mugabe and supported with 
loans and technical assistance the 
efforts he was making to refloat the 
national economy, it pressurized him 
to make concessions to the 
Opposition. (President Hu Jintao did 
not visit Zimbabwe during his 2007 
tour of southern Africa). That 
approach (support your friend in 
public but rebuke him in private) 
must have been one of the things that 
made Mugabe to sign, in 2008, a 
unity government agreement with the 
two factions of the Movement for 
Democratic Change. Less than a year 
after the unity government was 
formed, China gave the government 
$950m in foreign aid (British 
Broadcasting Corporation, 2009). 
While South Africa and SADC were 
credited with brokering the 
agreement, China was acknowledged 
as “the power behind the curtain” 
(Evans, 2008).   
 
The Darfur crisis which broke out 
about a decade after the Rwandan 
genocide also tested the effectiveness 
of China‟s conflict diplomacy in 
Africa. It received a lot of attention 
possibly because it broke out when 
the debates over the UN‟s lethargic 
intervention in the genocide were 
raging. China showed an interest in 
its resolution from the outset 
(Ahmed, 2010). It supported all the 
solutions that were suggested except 
those ones that contradicted its 
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stance on the inviolability of 
sovereignty. It did not veto the 2005 
resolution that imposed a UN arms 
sanction on Sudan; nor did it oppose 
the deployment of a Khartoum-
sanctioned UN peacekeeping 
operation (UNPKO) to Darfur 
(Holslag, 2007). A PKO without 
Khartoum‟s consent would have 
exacerbated the crisis and violated 
the UN principle that requires the 
consent of “the main parties to the 
conflict” before a PKO is deployed 
(United Nations [UN], “Principles of 
UN Peacekeeping”, n. d.).  
 
China firmed up its conflict 
diplomacy with the appointment, for 
the first time ever, of a special envoy 
for Africa. The envoy whose 
responsibilities resemble those of 
America‟s Under-Secretary for 
African Affairs and the EU‟s African 
Peace Facility would be its 
permanent representative to the AU. 
Before the appointment was made in 
2007, vice-foreign affairs minister, 
Zhai Jun coordinated its response to 
the conflict. The appointment not 
only integrated it into the crisis‟ 
multilateral peace framework, but 
also institutionalized its peace efforts 
on the continent. The envoy, Liu 
Guijin was an experienced head in 
African affairs, having been 
ambassador to Kenya, Ethiopia, 
Zimbabwe, and South Africa, and 
head of African affairs in the foreign 
affairs ministry. He participated in 
most of the crisis‟ talks. He also held 
separate meetings with each of the 
other troubleshooters, viz. the AU, 
the Arab League, the EU, and the 
USA. His appointment paved the 
way for the institutionalization of his 
country‟s peace efforts on the 
continent.   
 
President El-Bashir opposed the 
attempt to replace the African Union 
Mission in Sudan (AMIS) with 
another PKO, possibly because of 
this reason adduced by de Waal 
(n.d.):  
 
Khartoum sees a UN force as a 
surrender of sovereignty, and 
believes it would have the 
mandate to apprehend 
individuals indicted by the 
International Criminal Court 
and fly them to the Hague.  
President Bashir worries about 
a Chapter VII peacekeeping 
operation with authority to use 
force being present in northern 
Sudan should conflict break out 
in the run up to the 2011 
referendum on self-
determination in southern 
Sudan. He resents the way in 
which the push for UN troops 
has been conducted through 
bluster and threat. 
 
He must have reasoned that another 
PKO could be rigged and used to 
pursue the type of mission creep that 
toppled Muammar Gadhafi of Libya. 
He allowed the deployment of the 
hybrid UN-AU Mission in Darfur 
(UNAMID) that was subsequently 
proposed by former UN secretary-
general Kofi Annan only after a 
series of talks with Chinese leaders 
and diplomats (Kleine-Ahlbrandt & 
Small, 2008). It was when China was 
occupying the rotating UNSC 
presidency that Resolution 1769 
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which authorized the deployment of 
the hybrid AU-UNPKO was adopted 
(Guijin, 2008). The AU-UN 
mediation efforts on the crisis 
received $500,000 from China 
(“China Donates US$100,000 to 
ECOWAS Peace Fund”, 2009). 
Holslag (2008) noted that El-Bashir 
eventually consented to the hybrid 
PKO because China used diplomacy 
rather than threats of punishment.  
 
China laced its conflict diplomacy 
with incentives. For example, during 
his 2007 trip to Sudan in February 
2007 President Hu Jintao said his 
country would forgive $80m of debts 
(Mallaby, 2007), extend a $12.8m- 
interest-free loan for the construction 
of a presidential palace (McDoom, 
2007), and offer a $5.1m grant for 
“an array of projects” (Edinger, 
2007). Those incentives, however, 
were yoked to the exhortation: 
“Darfur is a part of Sudan and you 
have to resolve this problem” 
(McDoom, 2007).  
 
Peacekeeping  
China is still a peripheral participant 
in the UN peacekeeping system 
(UNPKS) because it currently 
contributes mostly non-combat 
troops to the UNPKOs. Nevertheless, 
its peripheral participation “fills a 
key gap and is important to the 
viability and success of UN 
peacekeeping operations” 
(International Crisis Group [ICG], 
2009). Compliance with the UN 
peacekeeping principle that requires 
the consent of the major parties to a 
conflict before a PKO is deployed is 
a condition for its support for, or 
participation in, a PKO. Securing the 
prior consent of the major parties is 
good because it “provides the UN 
with the necessary freedom of action, 
both political and physical, to carry 
out its mandated tasks [and prevents 
a PKO troops from] becoming a 
party to the conflict; and being 
drawn towards enforcement action, 
and away from its fundamental role 
of keeping the peace” (UN, 
“Principles of UN Peacekeeping”, 
n.d.). China‟s insistence that Sudan‟s 
prior consent to the hybrid PKO be 
secured was one of the factors that 
instigated the insinuation that it was 
supporting President El-Bashir in the 
crisis.  
 
Africa is the greatest beneficiary of 
China‟s involvement in the UNPKS 
in that three-quarters of Chinese blue 
helmets have served on the continent 
(Shelton, 2008). China began to 
contribute personnel to the UNPKOs 
in 1989 when it sent twenty 
observers to participate in UNTAG 
(1989-90)---the United Nations 
Transition Assistance Group in 
Namibia (Shelton, 2008). Before 
then, its participation in the PKOs 
did not extend beyond financial and 
debating contributions. Since then, 
its troops have participated in the 
following UNPKOs on the continent: 
UNOMIL, UNMIL, UNOMSIL, 
UNAMSIL, UNIOSIL, UNMEE, 
ONUB, ONUMOZ, UNMIS, 
MONUC/MONUSCO, UNTAG, 
MINUSMA, UNOCI, MINURSO, 
UNAMID, and UNMIS (UN, 
“Peacekeeping”, n.d.). In 2013, Mali 
became the first country in the world 
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to host its combat blue helmets 
(Hille, 2013). In 2014, South Sudan 
became the second country to host 
such troops (Smith, 2014). 
 
China also has been supporting 
African PKOs with funds and 
logistics. African PKOs are generally 
inadequately resourced. They totter 
under a chronic inadequacy of 
personnel, funds and logistics, with 
the result that they rely heavily on 
external financial and logistic 
support. (AMIS was replaced with 
UNAMID when it became 
unmistakably clear that it was 
collapsing). China has been helping 
to alleviate these financial and 
logistic constraints. For example, 
AMIS has been assisted with $1.8 
million (Christensen & Swan, 2008), 
the African Union Mission in 
Somalia, (AMISON) with $300 
million (Large, 2008), and the 
ECOWAS Peace Fund with 
$100,000 (“China Donates Money to 
Back Diplomatic Efforts to End 
Darfur Crisis”, 2008).   
 
Post-Conflict Recovery Support 
Post-conflict recovery efforts are 
given a lot of attention because post-
conflict situations can be very tricky. 
Countries emerging from conflict 
recover at different rates. They are 
also liable to suffer a post-conflict 
relapse. Some of the countries that 
have suffered a post-conflict relapse 
in recent years are Liberia, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Iraq, Egypt, and Libya. (The Second 
World War resulted from a post-
conflict relapse). It has been argued 
that about a half of all civil wars are 
caused by a post-conflict relapse 
(Collier, 2004). The state of the 
economy and the institutions of 
governance prior to the conflict 
largely determines the speed at 
which a country will recover from a 
conflict. Thus, post-conflict recovery 
is likely to be faster in Europe than 
in Africa and most parts of Asia.  
 
It was only recently that post-conflict 
recovery began to receive serious 
attention from the UN.  In 2005, the 
UN Security Council passed a 
resolution, recognising it as one of 
the areas where the capacity of 
regional and sub-regional 
organizations for dealing with 
conflict should be strengthened 
(UNSC, 2005). The United Nations 
General Assembly established the 
Peace building Commission that 
same year. The Commission is 
mandated to: (1) “bring together all 
relevant actors to marshal resources 
and to advise on and propose 
integrated strategies for post-conflict 
peace building and recovery;”  (2) 
“focus attention on the 
reconstruction and institution-
building efforts necessary for  
recovery from conflict and to support 
the development of integrated 
strategies in order to lay the 
foundation for sustainable 
development;” and (3) “provide 
recommendations and information to 
improve the coordination of all 
relevant actors within and outside the 
United Nations, to develop best 
practices, to help to ensure 
predictable financing for early 
recovery activities and to extend the 
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period of attention given by the 
international community to post-
conflict recovery” (UN, “Mandate of 
the Peace building Commission”,  
n.d.).  
 
China supports post-conflict 
recovery efforts on the continent in 
different ways. The free medical 
services, skills acquisition trainings, 
infrastructure reconstruction, etc. 
which its non-combat troops provide 
offer “the support vital to addressing 
the immediate needs of local 
populations in fragile states that have 
come out of conflict, or remain 
affected by it” (Mariani, 2011). 
Peacekeepers from other countries 
benefit from the free medical 
services too (Thompson, 2005).   
 
Angola, Liberia, and Kenya are 
among the countries that have 
benefited from the support. The 
National Reconstruction Programme, 
the flagship of Angola‟s recovery 
efforts, has been mostly 
implemented with Chinese loans and 
assistance (Thompson, 2005). 
Liberia received 20 motorcycles for 
its 2011 general elections (Chinese 
Embassy, 2011), 171 training slots 
and about $10m‟s worth of aid for its 
armed forces (Chinese Embassy, 
2011), and 140 anti-riot Chinese 
police officers for the efforts to 
prevent a security vacuum that might 
follow the winding down of its 
UNPKO (Garblah, 2013). Kenya 
received $300,000 for the 
humanitarian efforts that followed its 
2007 post-election violence (Large, 
2008).  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Africa-China relationship is not only 
about the exploitation of the 
economic opportunities that abound 
on the continent. It is also about 
China‟s peace efforts there. Those 
efforts which involve mediation, 
peacekeeping, and support for post-
conflict recovery efforts have 
benefitted from the reputation which 
China has earned among most 
Africans as an honest broker.  
 
China has been accused of having a 
close relationship with debatably 
corrupt and autocratic leaders like 
Mugabe and El-Bashir. Yet, it is the 
ability to do business with both 
„saints‟ and „sinners‟ that has made it 
“an important and potentially 
decisive voice on African peace and 
security issues” (Van Hoeymissen, 
2011). It does not dictate conditions 
or issue ultimatums at peace talks 
and will veto any UNSC proposal 
(sanction and PKO) that does not 
enjoy the support of the AU or any 
of its sub-regional organizations. It 
defers to the positions of these 
organizations because it “considers 
them well placed to make certain 
judgements on issues that impact the 
sovereignty and internal affairs of 
their members” (Van Hoeymissen, 
2011). In the Africa Policy paper it 
released in 2006, it pledged both 
moral and financial support for their 
peace efforts (Forum on China-
Africa Cooperation [FOCAC], 
2006).   
 
China‟s peace efforts on the 
continent are deepening and 
mutating. The shrinkage of 
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America‟s and Europe‟s troop 
contribution has created a vacuum 
which the major “culprits” in the so-
called „Second Scramble for Africa‟-
--China, India, Japan, South Korea, 
Russia, and Brazil--- are expected to 
fill. So far only China has shown 
sufficient evidence of readiness to 
fill that vacuum. Its troops are 
participating in seventy-five percent 
of all the current UNPKOs on the 
continent (UN, “Current 
Peacekeeping Operations, n.d.).  
 
Suggestions 
Troubleshooting in Africa generally 
faces a constraint of low confidence 
level. Most of the peace efforts there 
are hampered by reservations about 
the impartiality of their spearheads 
or sponsors. For example, the MDC 
does not trust South Africa to be 
impartial in its mediation in the 
Zimbabwean political conflict. 
Similarly, most people in the French-
speaking countries do not trust 
French-led peace efforts in their 
internal conflicts. As a consequence, 
no sooner are most ceasefire 
agreements signed than they are 
broken. Given this fact, China should 
be encouraged to invest its immense 
popularity with Africans in the 
efforts to bring down the continent‟s 
conflict rate. 
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